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Fraying the Hangman's Knot?: State v. Michael Owen Perry
I. INTRODUCTION
Death penalty cases are always difficult. In no other situation is the
requirement of careful analysis of factual and legal issues more critical. Courts
faced with such a case must balance the need of the sovereign to maintain order
through the imposition of legislatively mandated and judicially prescribed
penalties against the undesirable task of purposefully taking a human life.
Decision-making is even more troublesome when additional issues are added
to the balancing process. Such was the situation in the Louisiana case of State
v. Perry (hereinafter Perry !).' In that 1992 case, the defendant, convicted and
sentenced to death, was found to be mentally incompetent to be executed absent
the use of antipsychotic medication.2 The Supreme Court of Louisiana faced the
question of whether the state could forcibly medicate Perry in order to maintain
his mental competence for execution.
The holding and opinion of the supreme court in Perry 11 are the subject of
this note. Specifically, the remainder of Part I presents the facts and procedural
history of the entire Perry case and provides the reader with a brief insight into
the main points of this article. Following that, Part II surveys state and federal
exemptions of mentally incompetent persons from the death penalty, standards
and procedures for evaluating mental competence, and forcible medication of
prisoners. Part III outlines the supreme court opinion in Perry H1, and Part IV
provides an in-depth critique of that opinion. Part V proposes an analysis which
may be employed in examining the Perry problem; and Part VI concludes by
offering a proposed statute which provides specific guidance for future courts
faced with similar cases.
In the early morning hours of July 17, 1983, Michael Owen Perry entered
the unlocked house of his cousins, Randy Perry and Brian LeBlanc.' Inside,
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
2. Antipsychotic drugs, also referred Io as neuroleptics, are one category of psychoactive or
psychotropic drugs. Since the 1950's. they have been widely used to control symptoms of
schizophrenia and other major affective disorders and have become the topic of much legal
commentary in the context of forcible administration of the drugs in various settings. The brand
names of such drugs include Haldol, Thorazine, and Prolixin. For an excellent explanation of the
history, use, and effects of antipsychotic medication, see Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to Just Say No:
A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 53 La. L. Rev. 283 (1992).
For insight into the actual chemical and anatomical reactions produced by the drugs, see Thomas A.
Gutheil and Paul S. Appelbaum. "Mind Control. " "Synthetic Sanity, " "Artificial Competence. " and
Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medicatio , 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 77
(1983).
3. The facts of the crime presented here are summarized from the Supreme Court of Louisiana
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Perry shot and killed them both as they slept. Next, he crossed the street, broke
into the locked home of his parents, and awaited their arrival. When Grace and
Chester Perry returned from an out-of-town trip with their two-year-old grandson,
Anthony Bonin, Michael Perry shot all three as they entered the house. After
moving the bodies from the doorway, he shot each in the head again to ensure
death. Following the murders, Perry fled.
Two weeks later, Perry was arrested in Washington, D.C., and returned to
Louisiana for trial. Prior to the trial, two separate commissions were appointed
by the state to determine Perry's mental capacity to stand trial.4 After the first,
it was determined that Perry required treatment, and he was sent to Feliciana
Forensic Facility. The second commission found him able to assist his counsel
in his defense and competent to stand trial. The judge ruled Perry competent to
stand trial and then allowed him, over the objection of his counsel, to withdraw
his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and stand on a plea of not guilty. 5
In October of 1984, Perry was convicted of five counts of first degree
murder. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty, finding under
Code of Criminal Procedure article 905.3 that two aggravating circumstances
existed: (1) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm
to more than one person; and (2) the offense was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.6 The trial judge subsequently imposed the
death penalty.
After sentencing, Perry was sent to Angola state prison where he was
immediately prescribed and given regular doses of the antipsychotic drug Haldol.
Perry continued to receive medication at the prison until a request was submitted
by his counsel to remove him from the medication on March 14, 1988.' On
opinion in State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543 (La. 1987) (hereinafter Pery i) and Brief on Behalf of the
State of Louisiana, State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992) (No. 91-KP-1324).
4. Michael Perry's mental problems are well-documented. At 16, he was diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic. Two years later he was committed to the Central State Hospital at Pineville
for schizophrenic symptoms. See Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38, 111
S. Ct. 449 (1990) (No. 89-5120). Furthermore, the author's interview with Keith Nordyke, Perry's
attorney, at his Baton Rouge office on August 24. 1993, provided insight into Perry's mental
condition at the time of his arrest. Perry had rented a hotel room and filled it with television sets
on which he had painted eyeballs and had written the names of his victims. Finally, the author had
the extraordinary experience of meeting Michael Owen Perry on Death Row at Angola State
Penitentiary in September of 1993. After a discussion that lasted about one hour, no doubt was left,
in this author's wholly unprofessional opinion, that he was delusional, irrational, and completely out
of touch with reality.
5. Perry 1, 502 So. 2d at 547.
6. Id. at 547.
7. The circumstances of Perry's removal from regular medication became an issue later in the
case. The trial court appointed Mr. Keith Nordyke of Baton Rouge as Perry's counsel and, at the
request of Mr. Nordyke, authorized him to make medical decisions on behalf of Perry. Pursuant to
that authority and without notice to prosecutors. Nordyke then instructed prison officials to remove
Perry from all treatments. Prior to that time, Perry had been voluntarily taking Haldol as prescribed
by the prison psychiatrist. See Brief on Behalf of the State of Louisiana at 5, State v. Perry, 610 So.
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direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed Perry's conviction. 8 In
an opinion written by Justice Cole, the court, citing Code of Criminal Procedure
article 642, recommended that defense counsel apply to the court for a post-
conviction sanity commission:
The State of Louisiana will not execute one who has become insane
subsequent to his conviction of a capital crime .... The State will not
impose the death penalty on Michael Owen Perry if a court determines
he has become insane subsequent to his conviction for first degree
murder and lacks the capacity to understand the death penalty. Counsel
for the defendant may apply to the trial court for appointment of a
sanity commission to make such a determination. Indeed, the allegation
of mental incapacity may be raised by the court or the prosecution. 9
In January of 1988, the trial court ordered such a hearing, appointing three
psychiatrists and a psychologist to examine Perry. The experts unanimously
agreed that Perry suffered from a schizo-affective disorder "that causes serious
hallucinations, delusional and disordered thinking, incoherent speech, and manic
behavior."'
By August of 1988, the trial court (based on ex parte reports from prison
officials) determined that Perry's condition had probably changed since the first
sanity commission and ordered a second evaluation, employing two of the
original four doctors. The court scheduled a hearing to finally determine Perry's
competence to be executed.
After examining the commission's report and hearing testimony from the
doctors, the trial court discovered the lack of a clear standard of competence for
execution in Louisiana." The court then relied on Perry 1, Code of Criminal
Procedure articles 641-661, and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in the
Supreme Court case of Ford v. Wainright 12 to "fashion a standard through
analogy with Louisiana's existing statutes and state and federal jurisprudence."' 3
The final order of the court was as follows: "It is ordered that defendant,
Michael Owen Perry, is mentally competent for purposes of execution, and that
he is aware of the punishment he is about to suffer, and he is aware of the
reason that he is to suffer said punishment."'
' 4
2d 746 (La. 1992) (No. 91-KP-1324).
8. Pert I, 502 So. 2d at 563-64.
9. Id.
10. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. 1992).
11. Oral Reasons For Judgment, State v. Perry, 19th Judicial District Court, October 21, 1988,
at 95.
12. 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986) (discussed infra at notes 40-41 and accompanying
text).
13. Oral Reasons for Judgment, supra note 11, at 97.
14. Id. at 117.
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The trial court, however, determined Perry was "competent only while
maintained on psychotropic medication in the form of Haldol."' 5  After
reviewing the statutes and the jurisprudential background of forcible medication
for purposes of competency to stand trial, the trial judge reasoned that, even
medicated, Perry met the competence standard stated above. Finally the court
weighed the interest of the state in carrying out its penalty versus Perry's interest
in refusing medication and stated:
[1It is felt by this Court that Louisiana's interest in the execution of
[the] jury's verdict override [sic] [the] rights of Mr. Perry [to refuse
medication]. The State is entitled to have [its] judgment made
executory. To allow Mr. Perry to have the authority to make this
decision and to refuse treatment and thereby become incompetent would
allow total usurption [sic] of the criminal laws in this area.1 6
That order was the subject of immediate appeal to both the Supreme Court
of Louisiana and the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana denied certiorari 7 and appeal,' a but the Supreme Court of the
United States subsequently granted the writ.'9  After receiving briefs and
hearing oral arguments, the Court vacated. certiorari and remanded to the trial
court20 to re-examine in light of its recent decision in Washington v. Harper.2'
On remand, the trial court again accepted briefs and heard oral argument but
found the Harper case inapposite and reinstated its original medication order.
The court specifically adopted Justice Powell's test for competence in Ford:
"Under this test, which this court hereby adopts, the state is prohibited from
15. Id. at 115.
16. Id. at 117.
17. State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989).
18. Id.
19. Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 1015, 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
20. Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990).
21. 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990). The Harper decision was rendered by the Court just
five days before oral argument in Perry and is discussed infra at note 58 and accompanying text.
A review of Justice Marshall's recently released memoirs provides several interesting side notes: (1)
Despite the fact that there were some reports that Perry had made threats to Justice O'Connor some
years before the case arose, she had no recollection of such events and decided not to recuse herself.
(2) The original plan, proposed by Justice White, was to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme
Court as to whether Louisiana law permitted the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs for
the purpose of maintaining competence for execution. After receiving its answer, the Court could
have let the issue rest tinder Louisiana law, but would have maintained jurisdiction if the Louisiana
decision had been unfavorable. While this proposal was eventually abandoned, it demonstrates that
at least some members of the Court believed that Louisiana law was the appropriate first choice for
the basis of the decision. (3) The Court. at the time, consisted of only eight Justices-Justice Souter
was still involved in the confirmation process. While there are no specific allusions to the fact, it
may be that the Court chose to "return" the case to the State and decide it later with a full court,
thereby avoiding a possible 4-4 vote.
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executing those who are unaware of the punishment they are to suffer and why
they are to suffer it."22
After the second trial, Perry again applied for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana. The court granted the writ and stayed the
execution pending its holding.23 After briefs and argument, the court affirmed
the trial court's finding that Perry was not competent absent the use of
antipsychotic medication, but reversed the order to forcibly medicate him. 24 In
a majority opinion written by Justice Dennis, the court held the order to medicate
Perry for purposes of maintaining his mental competence for execution violated
both Perry's right of privacy under Article I, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, and the prohibition against cruel, excessive, or unusual
punishment of Article I, section 20.23
• While correct in conclusion under the law at the time, the majority opinion
failed in several significant areas. The court, in an opinion that has been called
"forty-seven pages of sociology," 26 provided an in-depth review of "the
centuries old prohibition against execution of the insane, ' 27 but gave no solid
legal basis for that prohibition under current law. Furthermore, as evidenced by
the necessity that the trial court "fashion" a standard for mental competence to
be executed, the court also failed by not providing a specific legal test to be
applied in determining the mental competence required of a person before he
may be executed.
The court also provided an in-depth analysis of the right to privacy under the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 but failed to properly weigh this right against the
interest of the state in carrying out its prescribed penalty. Such a failure sets
dangerous precedent by allowing the unchecked privacy right to eclipse valid
state interests and may potentially have serious ramifications on Louisiana's
criminal justice system.
Furthermore, the court, by requiring the state to demonstrate that Perry has
become mentally competent, independent of any drugs, before it may seek to
modify the stay of execution, allowed Perry to voluntarily take the drugs which
he refused to take in order to avoid execution. If he does voluntarily accept
medication, 28 the state may never seek to modify the stay of execution since it
will never be able to show Perry's mental condition was achieved independently
of drugs. In effect, the very drugs the state could not force him to take may now
22. Oral Reasons for Judgment, State v. Perry, 19th Judicial District COurt, April 25, 1991, at
9 (emphasis added).
23. State v. Perry, 584 So. 2d 1145 (La. 1991).
24. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 771 (La. 1992).
25. Id. at 749-71.
26. Justice Luther F. Cole, Address to the Legal Writing Seminar of Louisiana State University
Law School (Nov. 9, 1993).
27. Perry II, 610 So. 2d at 747.
28. At the meeting with Perry, see sispra note 4, Perry told the author that he was on daily
medication (after the Supreme CoLirt opinion). This statement, however, cannot be considered
reliable, considering Perry's mental state at the time.
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serve as the main obstacle to the state in carrying out Perry's sentence. Again,
this precedent could have serious ramifications on the administration of the death
penalty.
The above criticisms are discussed in more detail following a presentation
of the legal background in the next section.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Exempting the Insane From Execution-An Historical Analysis
The notion that insane persons may not be punished by death dates back to
at least the mid-17th Century: "It is uncharitable to dispatch of an offender into
another world, when he is not of capacity to fit himself for it."'29 Most of the
early common-law rationales for exempting insane persons from execution are
based in religious and moral tenets. Besides the belief that a madman could not
prepare himself for the afterlife, many early commentators simply believed that
to put to death one who was insane was "a miserable spectacle, both against law,
and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty."'  Others felt that madness was
punishment, in and of itself, which offset the need for execution.3 1
As mentioned above, however, these ancient reasons for exempting insane
persons from execution may carry little weight in today's legal system. "The
sheer number of rationales may indicate that the rule was designed to address
social concerns which are now obsolete. 32 What should be judged is a legal
level of competence which is derived from and grounded in the criteria and
justifications (or the lack thereof) for the death penalty itself.
It has also been argued that a convicted person must be able to assist his
counsel in defense up until the very last possible moment. This, again, is a
somewhat old idea and presupposes that insanity or incompetence robs the
inmate of all capability to assist his counsel. Furthermore, the current appeal
process for capital punishment cases ensures all facts are determined before the
penalty is assessed, and it is unlikely a convicted offender will discover new
facts or develop a new legal theory between the end of the appeal process and
the execution itself.33 Nevertheless, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, this rationale must be considered in developing the test for competence
to be executed.
Another traditional argument focuses on the lack of deterrence of potential
future criminals. As far back as Lord Coke, it was believed that execution of
29. Perry II, 610 So. 2d at 749 (quoting Hales. Remarks on the Trial of M. Charles Basement,
I I Howard State Trials 474, 477 (1685)).
30. 3 E. Coke, Institute 6 (1794).
31. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 395.
32. Barbara A. Ward, Competence for Execution: Problems in Liii and PsYchianty, 14 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 35, 48 (1986).
33. Id. at 50.
1706 [Vol. 54
NOTES
insane "can be no example to others."' A more modem view, however,
demonstrates the reverse logic of this attempted rationalization of exempting
insane persons from the death penalty: "If the purpose [of exempting the
incompetent from execution] is to serve as an example to others, the demonstra-
tion that not even supervening insanity will halt the execution of one who
commits a capital crime will ... make the in terroremn effect so much the
stronger."
33
A somewhat related rationale for exempting insane persons is the notion that
the execution of an insane person is somehow less acceptable to society than the
execution of a wholly sane offender. This rationale has been labeled "nothing
less than an oblique attack on the death penalty itself."36 As one noted jurist
suggested:
Is it not inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous the capital
punishment of those who have become insane after trial and conviction,
but accepts the capital punishment for sane men, a curious reasoning
that would free a man from capital punishment only if he is not in full
possession of his senses?37
The most intricate of the current rationales for exempting insane persons
from execution is the notion that the retributive effect of the death penalty is lost
on persons who are mentally incompetent. Since the deterrent effect of capital
punishment in general is somewhat suspect, most of the argument centers around
the retribution rationale. In one line of argument, retribution is not satisfied by
execution of an insane inmate because his death is not of "equal value" to the
life taken by him.38 A second argument holds that a prisoner must be able to
perceive the "expression of society's moral outrage," '39 in order to satisfy the
retribution criteria. Still a further point is made to the effect that, since an insane
person may not suffer as a result of the punishment of death, society gains no
retributive value from that punishment.
Whatever the historical background, virtually every common-law jurisdiction
which has the death penalty has a rule exempting insane or incompetent persons
from that form of punishment. Some are statutory, some are judicial, but few
are clearly articulated and (as this author would have it) grounded specifically
in the absence of underlying rationale for the death penalty itself.
34. E. Coke, Institute 6 (1794).
35. Henry Weihofen, A Question of Justice: Trial or Execution of an hisane Defendant, 37
A.B.A. J. 651. 652 (1951).
36. Geoffrey C. Hazard & David N. Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of
Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 381. 384 (1960).
37. Phyle v. Duffy, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (Cal. 1949) (en banc) (Traynor, J., concurring).
38. See Note, hisanity of the Condemned 88 Yale L.J. 533 (1979).
39. Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153. 183, 96 S. Ct. 2909. 2930 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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B. The Competence Standard-Federal Law
The Supreme Court of the United States constitutionalized the prohibition
against execution of the insane in the case of Ford v. Wainright. In that case,
which considered the mental competence for execution of a condemned prisoner
in Florida, Justice Marshall wrote a plurality opinion for four justices which
referred to the traditional rationale for exempting the insane from execution and
concluded: "There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or
acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the
Bill of Rights was adopted."4°
The more important opinion in this area of law has been Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, which subscribed to the notion that execution of incompetent
persons violated the Eighth Amendment (bringing the total number of Justices
who found executing insane persons per se unconstitutional to five4 ) but went
further than the plurality and defined a test to determine what level of mental
competence is required. Affirming the standard used by Florida and several
other states, Justice Powell found the appropriate rule to be that persons may not
be executed if they "are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and
why they are to suffer it."42 He also added:
Under these circumstances, I find no sound basis for constitutionalizing
the broader definition of insanity, with its requirement that the
defendant be able to assist in his own defense. States are obviously free
to adopt a more expansive view of sanity in this context than the one
the Eighth Amendment imposes as a constitutional minimum."3
The Powell "understanding" standard has been the most widely used test for
competence for execution since the Ford decision was delivered. This standard
is based in the underlying public policy of the death penalty. If a defendant is
able to perceive the connection between his crime and the punishment imposed,
40. Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 405. 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2599 (1986). Note that the Ford
case also dealt specifically with the procedural due process requirements of evaluating a person's
mental capacity for execution purposes. This issue is addressed in the plurality opinion and the
concurring and dissenting opinions.
41. Justices O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist dissented, specifically stating that the Eighth
Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane. Id. at 427, 106 S.
Ct. at 2611 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part); id. at 434-35, 106 S. Ct. at 2614-15 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
42. Id. at 422, 106 S. Ct at 2608.
43. Id. at 422 n.3, 106 S. Ct. at 2608 n.3. All states that currently have the death penalty have
statutory or jurisprudential prohibitions against executing the insane. Of those that have a clearly
defined test for competence, most employ the Powell test from Ford in one form or another. Some
add the requirement that the defendant be able to assist counsel up until the actual moment of




the goal of retribution is accomplished in the sense of the prisoner's comprehen-
sion of his wrongdoing and society's moral outrage. Furthermore, society's need
to exact "equal" suffering upon a capital offender is fulfilled. The deterrent
effect of the death penalty is also not diluted by allowing capital offenders to
escape from the justly imposed sentence of death simply because they have been
diagnosed with some medically-defined mental disorder.
Additionally, the Powell test satisfies the common-law criteria mentioned
above in that an inmate who understands his impending fate is able to prepare
himself for death. Society at large could find little difference in executing a
person who understands his crime and his punishment (although he may suffer
from some mental deficiency) and the execution of a wholly sane person (which
society has found acceptable through its legislature's approval of the death
penalty in the first place)."
C. The Competence Standard-Lottisiana Lxaw
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell left room for states to define their
own competence standard. However, because the Powell test is based on an
Eighth Amendment constitutional analysis, a state may define its standard so as
to afford a convicted criminal greater, but not less, protection than does the
Powell standard. However, as will be seen below, Louisiana, even after Perry
I1, has not yet adopted a clearly defined standard for competence to be executed.
In Louisiana, as in all states, there are three points in the criminal process
at which a defendant's mental capacity must be evaluated: at the time of the
crime, during the trial and appeal process, and at the time of execution (if that
penalty is imposed). Each of the three evaluations is based on a different public
policy and should, therefore, require a different legal test from the other two.
The requirement of a guilty mind defines the standard for the "not guilty by
reason of insanity" defense under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 650-658.
The procedures outlined in Code of Criminal Procedure articles 641-649.1,
governing mental capacity to proceed, are based in notions of due process and
the requirement that a defendant be able to participate in his trial.
Louisiana, however, has no specific standard for mental competence to be
executed. All too often, courts and commentators group this evaluation of
44. One author provides an excellent analysis of Justice Powell's derivation of the standard:
By evaluating the reasons existing at common law for prohibiting the execution of the
insane, Justice Powell concluded that the remaining validity of this prohibition today is
premised on the notion that "retributive force depends on the defendant's awareness of
the penalty's existence and purpose." Hence, Justice Powell distills the proper standard
of insanity as a determination of whether the inmates are "unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."
Rachelle Deckert Dick. Ford v. Wainright: Warning-Sanity on Death Row May be Hazardous to
Your Health. 47 La. L. Rev. 1351. 1355 (1987) (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 421, 422,
106 S. Ct. 2595. 2607. 2608 (Powell, J., concurring in part)) (citations omitted).
1994] 1709
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
mental capacity, along with the other two, under the diagnosis of some
medically-defined mental condition or the wholly undefined term "insanity."
What should exist is a specific legal test for competence to be executed which
is distinct from the other two evaluations of mental competence. Since the law,
as it exists today, provides no such standard, courts are most likely to apply the
procedure outlined in Articles 641-649.1 by analogy. 4 These articles and the
jurisprudence that interprets them are, therefore, important to the Perry analysis.
Due process requires that a defendant in a criminal trial have the mental
capacity to understand the proceedings and assist his counsel in his defense.
Articles 641-649.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure are set up to
evaluate a defendant's capability to do so. The articles set up a structure by
which the defendant must raise the issue of incapacity and prove that condition
to the court as a matter of law. The court may order evaluations and require
reports from sanity commissions before conducting a hearing to determine a
person's capacity to proceed in the judicial process.
The case of State v. Bennett 6 interpreted Article 641 and was the first case
to provide a specific test for competency to stand trial in Louisiana. After
stating that a determination of a defendant's ability to stand trial should be made
"not ... solely upon whether he suffers from a mental disease or defect, but
must be made with specific reference to the nature of the charge, the complexity
of the case and the gravity of the decisions with which he is faced,"47 the court
listed several criteria that must be considered in determining whether the
defendant is fully aware of the nature of the proceedings.48
When the Perry case arose, the issue of exempting insane persons from
capital punishment was not a matter of first impression in Louisiana. In State
v. Allen,49 the Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case of an inmate who
was denied application for a lunacy commission to determine his mental state
after his conviction for murder. The court examined a line of older cases and
Code of Criminal Procedure article 267 (a precursor to 641) and determined:
"One who has been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death, and who thereafter becomes insane, cannot be put to death
while in that condition." 50 What the Allen court failed to do, however, was to
explain on what grounds a trial court should determine a prisoner's sanity after
conviction. The court left much discretion with the trial judge, even-as in
Allen's case-the discretion as to whether or not a lunacy commission was
required.
45. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 641 states: -Mental incapacity to proceed
exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or assist in his defense."
46. 345 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1977).
47. Id. at 1138.
48. See id. at 1138 for specific factors.
49. 15 So. 2d 870 (La. 1943).
50. Id. at 871.
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The closest the Supreme Court of Louisiana has come to clearly articulating
a test by which an inmate's sanity or competence for execution may be
determined was in Justice Cole's opinion in Perry 1.5' There the court seemed
to adopt the "understand the death penalty" language of Justice Powell's Ford
opinion but added the requirement that the court determine Perry had become
insane, again employing that ambiguous term without legal definition. The court
stated that the issue of mental incapacity could be raised by either party or by
the trial court sua sponte and cited Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
642. Finally, the opinion clearly placed the burden of proof on the defendant,
requiring him to show "by a preponderance of the evidence that he lacks the
present capacity to undergo execution. '"5-
By referring to Article 642, the court may have been confirming the notion
of the trial court that the Code of Criminal Procedure articles dealing with mental
incapacity to proceed are to be applied by analogy to the post-conviction process
to determine competence for execution. As discussed above, however, the
question of competence for execution should have its own test and specific
criteria based on the underlying rationale for the death penalty. Furthermore, by
including the word "insane" in the determinative test, the Cole opinion left it to
the trial court to interpret the basic question of competence to be executed.
D. Forced Medication-Federal Law
The federal jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of a state's order to
forcibly medicate prisoners with antipsychotic drugs has been developing steadily
since the introduction of those drugs in the 1950's." Several constitutional
provisions have been relied upon as sources for a person's right to refuse such
medication, including the Eighth Amendment,'. 4 the First Amendment," the
Fourteenth Amendment, 56 as well as common-law doctrines such as informed
consent." The culmination of this development came in the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Washington v. Harpe, which was delivered just five
days before oral arguments were heard for Perry.
51. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
52. State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 564 (La. 1986).
53. See Cichon, supra note 2, for an overview of United States Supreme Court and other federal
cases.
54. See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973), in which the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that experimental use on an unwilling prisoner of behavior conditioning dnigs
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and Linusial punishment, even though the
State claimed the drug was not punishment but part of a treatment program.
55. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976). vacated, 458 U.S. 1101, 102 S. Ct. 3474
(1982).
56. Youngberg v. Roneo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).




In Harper, the Court considered the case of a convicted robber who was
forcibly administered antipsychotic drugs in accordance with a Washington prison
regulation. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court broke the issue down into its
separate procedural and substantive aspects: "[Tihe substantive issue is what
factual circumstances must exist before the State may administer antipsychotic
drugs to the prisoner against his will; the procedural issue is whether the State's
nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a particular case are
sufficient.""8 Citing Youngberg v. Romeo05 9 and Parham v. J.R.,6W the Court
answered the substantive question and found that Harper had a right to refuse
medical treatment based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6' The Court, however, recognized that this right is not absolute and must
be weighed against valid state interests in medicating the defendant. In this case,
the state of Washington cited two specific interests: its need to maintain order
among the prison population under the police power and itsparenspatriae interest
in ensuring that Harper received medication that was deemed necessary by his
physicians.62
The Court also considered important to the balancing process the fact that
Harper was a convicted and confined prisoner of the state and alluded to the notion
that, as a prisoner, his liberty interests may be somewhat diminished: "The extent
of a prisoner's right under the [Due Process] Clause to avoid unwanted administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in the context of the inmate's
confinement. 63
To the above-mentioned balancing test, the Court applied a reasonableness
standard that, since a prison regulation was involved, was "less restrictive than that
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."'
By stating that the "proper standard for determining the validity of a prison
regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether
the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,"' 6 the
Court gave great deference to the state's interests in forced medication, especially
where a prison inmate is concerned.
The Court then discussed the procedural requirements to be met before the
state could administer medication to Harper against his will and remanded to the
trial court for further consideration under its opinion. What is important to glean
58. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 220. 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1039 (1990).
59. 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
60. 442 U.S. 584, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
61. The Court's comments regarding the procedural issue are not germane to the analysis of
Perry and are, therefore, not presented in detail here.
62. The trial court found and the Supreme Court accepted that, unmedicated, Harper represented
a threat to both himself and other inmates and that the medication had been prescribed in Harper's
best interest.
63. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222, 110 S. Ct. at 1045.
64. Id. at 224, 110 S. Ct. at 1049 (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107
S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (1987)).
65. Id. (quoting Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987)).
1712 [Vol. 54
NOTES
from the Harper decision is that the Supreme Court recognized that an inmate has
a due process, liberty interest to refuse medication. This interest, however, is not
absolute, and any intrusion upon it by a state must bejustified by the relatively low
criteria of having a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest. Further-
more, the Court alluded to the fact that the state's interests were higher than normal
and the liberty interests lower than normal when the person whose liberty is
involved is a convicted prisoner (or at least when the intrusion is based on a prison
regulation).
Neither Harper nor any other United States Supreme Court case has addressed
the specific question of forced medication to produce or maintain competence for
execution. (It is probable that the Court expected to address that issue in Perry
after remand.) Nor did Harper address the cruel and unusual punishment issue
since, in Harper's case, the medication was purely for treatment purposes and not
ordered in a punishment context.
E. Forced Medication-Lotisiana Law
Louisiana constitutional protections of privacy extend further than do those of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The right to privacy under
Louisiana law, however, has never been considered absolute. There are several
statutory and jurisprudential situations in which the privacy right to refuse
medication is overruled by legitimate state interests.
Louisiana has a statute with a similar purpose to that of the Washington prison
regulation in Harper. Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:830.1 authorizes the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections to forcibly administer treatment to
mentally ill or mentally retarded inmates when a staff or consulting physician or
psychiatrist certifies that such treatment is required to prevent harm or injury to the
inmate or others. The Department may only continue the treatment for fifteen days,
after which time it must seek a court order to continue treatment.
Title 28 of the Revised Statutes deals with mental health and addresses forced
medication in the non-criminal context. Louisiana Revised Statutes 28:65 provides
for non-consensual medication of patients in mental facilities in both emergency
and non-emergency situations. Section 66 and following sections provide for an
administrative review prior to forced medication in non-emergency situations. In
emergency situations, however, a physician is authorized to treat a non-consenting
patient only when he determines that the patient's condition causes a threat of
physical harm to himself or others. The medication may only be continued as long
as the emergency exists and, in no case, may it exceed seventy-two hours.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 648 provides specifically for
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs in the criminal trial process.
Paragraph (2) provides:
If the person is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor classified as an
offense against the person and considered by the court to be likely to
commit crimes of violence, and if the court determines that his mental
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capacity is likely to be restored within ninety days as a result of treatment,
the court may order immediate jail-based treatment by the Department of
Health and Hospitals not to exceed ninety days; other-wise, if his capacity
cannot be restored within ninety days and inpatient treatment is recom-
mended, the court shall commit the defendant to the Feliciana Forensic
Facility.
The statute further provides for later review of the capacity of the charged
person to stand trial. If the court finds the person will not, in the foreseeable future,
be capable of standing trial, the court must release that person on probation. If,
however, the court finds the person to represent a danger to himself or others, the
court may commit him to a treatment facility-this action constituting a civil
commitment.
A review of the jurisprudence concerning Articles 641-649.1 reveals that a
defendant whose capacity to stand trial depends upon continued administration of
antipsychotic drugs has consistently been held competent to stand trial. In State v.
Plaisance,66 the supreme court held that a defendant who had already been
convicted on the basis he was medicated throughout the course of the trial could not
successfully claim the trial judge had made an error in evaluating his mental
capacity. The court found the defendant had been able to understand the
proceedings and assist in his defense and rejected the notion that such mental
capacity was invalid since it was induced by antipsychotic drugs.
The court took the same analysis one step further in State v. Hampton,6 7 by
outright rejection of the trial judge's finding that the antipsychotic medication of
a criminal defendant induced "synthetic sanity." The court reiterated that the
test for capacity to stand trial was the prisoner's understanding and ability to assist
counsel, whether induced by drugs or natural.
One final area of Louisiana jurisprudence requires mention. After adoption of
the 1974 Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme Court struggled somewhat with the
scope of the privacy protections afforded by Article 1, section 5. One side viewed
Section 5 to be limited to the realm of governmental intrusions related to
66. 210 So. 2d 323 (La. 1968).
67. 218 So. 2d 311 (La. 1969).
68. Id. at 312-13. The notion of "synthetic" or "'artificial" sanity is an important concept to
comprehend in examination of the Per, problem. A central question in Perry is: can the
medication achieve, in the individual, the required level of mental competence? This question
depends, to a large extent, upon medical testimony. While it may be that such testimony reveals that
antipsychotic medications do not cure the specific mental disorder but only alleviate the symptoms,
whether they create artificial or synthetic sanity depends upon the definition of sanity employed. As
has been maintained throughout this article, the question is answered if it is regarded as a legal
question of competence. If the clear standard employed is understanding the crime and the nature
of the punishment, a court can gather specific evidence, including medical testimony and its own
evaluation of the defendant, as to whether the drugs allow that defendant to understand. For an
excellent discussion of synthetic sanity, see Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 2.
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unreasonable searches and seizures.69 This view also held that Article I, section
5's guarantees were equal to, but no greater than, those of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Those who expounded the other view suggested that the
redactors of the 1974 Constitution understood full well the meaning of the word
"privacy," which had become a term of art by 1974, and intended for Section 5
protections to encompass all meanings of that term including the personal
autonomy type of privacy.7
By 1989, it had become clear that the word "privacy" in Section 5 encom-
passed at least some rights of personhood or individual autonomy outside of the
search and seizure realm and that those protections were generally broader in scope
than those of federal provisions. In June of 1989, the Louisiana Supreme Court
specifically extended Section 5's protections to the right to refuse unwanted
medications. In Hondroulis v. Schumacher, the court examined the case of a
woman who brought suit against her doctor for medical malpractice and failure to
properly inform her about the risk of a certain medical procedure. In an opinion by
Justice Dennis, 72 the court first examined the informed consent doctrine, but chose
to decide the case on constitutional grounds, stating:
[Section 5's] safeguard was intended to establish an affirmative right to
privacy impacting non-criminal areas of law and establishing the
principles of the Supreme Court decisions in explicit statement instead of
depending on analogical development. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Louisiana Constitution's right to privacy also provides for a right to
decide whether to obtain or reject medical treatment. 73
The court also indicated that this right might only be infringed upon by the
state if a compelling state interest could be demonstrated as justification.74
Hondroulis laid the foundation for much of the privacy argument in Perry !!.
Il1. THE PERRY!! OPINION
The majority opinion, written by Justice Dennis, in which Justices Watson,
Lemmon, and Hall concurred, 75 affirmed the trial court's finding that Perry was
69. See State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989) (Cole, J., dissenting); State v. Hernandez,
410 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1982) (Blanche, J., dissenting).
70. See John Devlin, Privacv (ad Abortion Rights ider the Louisiana Slate Constitution:
Coud Roe v. Wade be Alive and Well in the Bayon State, 51 La. L. Rev. 685 (1991); Lee Hargrave,
The Declaration of Rights of the Loaisiana Constitution, 35 La. L. Rev. I (1974).
71. 546 So. 2d 466 (La. 1989).
72. Justice Dennis' activity in the privacy realm has been significant. He began as a dissenter
in Henandez and over time encouraged the court's shift toward a broader interpretation of Article
1, section 5's protections. Hondronlis took the scope of privacy into the medical decision realm, and
Perry H1 expanded it even further.
73. Hondroulis, 546 So. 2d at 473 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 473.
75. While Justice Hall joined the opinion, he stated in concurrence that he "does not fully
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incompetent for execution without the use of antipsychotic drugs, but reversed the
order to administer those drugs to Perry without his consent. The court held the
forcible administration of such medication for the purposes of restoring or
maintaining competence for execution violated Perry's privacy rights under Article
I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.76 The court further held the
medication was cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment proscribed by Article I,
section 20."
The majority opinion began by examining the rationale behind the common-
law prohibition against executing the insane. After reviewing the traditional
purposes of the prohibition, the Court mentioned the recent United States Supreme
Court case of Ford v. Wainright and the Louisiana line of cases beginning with
State v. Allen, 7 all of which exempt insane or incompetent inmates from the
ultimate pettalty. Finding execution of the insane "thrice banned in our state,"79
the court turned to the question of medication and forcible administration.
The court first addressed the question whether it should apply Louisiana or
federal constitutional analysis.' Relying on federal and state jurisprudence, the
majority found the case must first be resolved on state constitutional grounds.8t
Despite this finding, the majority opinion used several pages to distinguish Perry
11 from Harper.
subscribe to all that is said in Section V of the opinion." State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 771 (La.
1992) (Hall, J., concurring in part). Justice Lemmon concurred only as to Section Vi, the cruel,
excessive, or unusual argument, denoting that at least some of Justice Dennis' privacy argument did
not carry a majority of the Court. Id. at 772 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 747. Article 1, section 5 states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or alftrmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or
reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
77. Pero , II, 610 So. 2d at 747. Article I, section 20 states: "No law shall subject any person
to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall
be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following conviction for any offense."
78. 204 La. 513, 15 So. 2d 870 (1943).
79. Pen-%' II, 610 So. 2d at 750.
80. The federalism issue raises an interesting question: since the United States Supreme Court
remanded the case in light of larper after the Louisiana Supreme Court had declined to review it,
it may be argued that the case was closed as to Louisiana law and that the only subject still open was
the federal law question based upon a larper analysis. Had the United States Suipreme Court denied
writ, the case cottld have been closed as to both Louisiana and federal constitutional questions.
Somehow, however, the review by the United States Supreme Court reopened the state law issue to
review by the Louisiana Supreme Court. Professor John Devlin discussed this "ratchet" effect in
John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 54 La. L. Rev. 683 (1994).
81. Perry II, 610 So. 2d at 750-51. There are two viewpoints with respect to whether a state
court should look first to its own constitution or proceed ttnder federal constitutional analysis and
federal jurisprudence. At present, the view taken by the majority in Pery II is predominant in
most United States jurisdictions and seems to be the prevailing view in Louisiana. For excellent
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The substantive portions of the majority opinion deal with the privacy and
cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment arguments against the trial court's
medication order. The opinion first examined Perry's privacy interest to refuse
medical treatment.82 It began by examining the jurisprudential interpretation of
Article I, section 5. Citing State v. Church,8 3 State v. Hernandez,", and State
v. Breaux,85 the court reaffirmed the fact that the Louisiana Constitution's
guarantee of privacy exceeds, in scope and application, the similar guarantee of
the United States Constitution under the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment.
86
The Court then examined the case of Hondroulis v. Schumacher, another
opinion authored by Justice Dennis, in which the court specifically considered
the right to obtain or reject medical treatment in the context of a civil suit. In
explanations of the two conflicting viewpoints, see Justice Hans A. Linde. First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights. 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379 (1980) (arguing for application of
state law first), and Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 995
(1985) (arguing for judicial restraint by state courts in application of their state constitutional
laws).
82. The choice of the words "medical treatment" throughout the privacy argument presented by
the majority seems to present somewhat of a contradiction with an earlier part of the opinion. In
discussing the comparison to the Harper case, Justice Dennis found for the court:
"[A] physician's prescription and administration of antipsychotic drugs to a prisoner
against his will, pursuant to the order of a state court or other government official, for the
purpose of carrying out the death penalty, does not constitute medical treatment, but forms
part of the capital punishment sought to be executed by the state."
Perry l/, 610 So. 2d at 753 (emphasis added). The privacy argument, however, is based, almost
exclusively, on a person's right to refuse medical treatment. While it is likely that the words
"medical treatment," as used in this part of the opinion, should be read to mean "medication" or
"medical activity with respect to one's body." the apparent contradiction in the opinion does exist.
83. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989) (holding that, while DWI roadblocks did not violate the privacy
protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, such
methods did violate the guarantee of privacy under Article I. section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution).
84. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982). In an opinion by Justice Dennis, the court held that a
warrantless search of a suspect's automobile after he was arrested for DWI violated his right to
privacy tinder Article 1, section 5. of the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, with reference to
interpreting that article, the court cited the Preamble to the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, stating:
We. of course, give careful consideration to the United States Supreme Court
interpretations of relevant provisions of the federal constitution, but we cannot and should
not allow those decisions to replace our independent judgment in construing the
constitution adopted by the people of Louisiana .... lArticle I, section 5'sl constitutional
declaration of rights is not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive
with it; it is one of the most conspicuous instances in which our citizens have chosen a
higher standard of individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting
the federal constitution.
410 So. 2d at 1385 (citations omitted).
85. 329 So. 2d 696 (La. 1976) (holding that a warrantless search violated Article 1. section 5).
86. Perry II, 610 So. 2d at 755. For the basis of the United States Constitution's protection of
privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). For analysis of the expanded scope of the Article I section 5,
guarantee of privacy, see Devlin, supra note 70, and Hargrave, supra note 70.
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that case, the court was asked to decide if a plaintiff had stated a cause of action
in a medical malpractice suit in which a doctor failed to advise the patient-
plaintiff of alternative methods of treatment and the specific risks of the
treatment chosen. After citing the common-law informed consent doctrine, the
court addressed the constitutional issue of the right to make personal medical
choices under Article I, section 5's privacy guarantee. This was the first case in
Louisiana to extend the privacy protection of Article I beyond the search and
seizure realm.'7
From the above analysis, the court concluded that the "Louisiana Constitu-
tion's right to privacy also provides for a right to decide whether to obtain or
reject medical treatment,"88 and extended this conclusion to Perry's case.
Having found that Perry had a right to refuse medical treatment, the court then
applied a "compelling state interest" test to determine if the state's interests in
executing Perry outweighed his interests as, stated above.' 9 Citing the state's
claims, under Harper,9° that Perry represented a threat to both himself and
others, the court stated: "We believe these purposes were manufactured with the
benefit of hindsight and did not in fact motivate the challenged court order."9'
The court then considered the interests of the state in carrying out the penalty of
death. Referring to the next section of the opinion concerning cruel or unusual
punishment, the court summarily concluded that "the execution of a forcibly
medicated insane prisoner will not contribute to the goal of either retribution or
deterrence of capital offenses. 9 -
87. It may be argued that the issue in IHondroulis could have been resolved without resorting
to constitutional analysis, or that "privacy" as used in Section 5 was not intended by the redactors
of the 1974 Constitution to be expanded beyond the scope of search and seizure cases and into the
realm of personal autonomy. See Devlin, supra note 70. That Article 1, section 5's privacy extends
to personal autonomy cases is not necessarily a settled issue in Louisiana. See Sudwischer v. Estate
of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474 (La. 1991).
88. Perry I, 610 So. 2d at 756 (emphasis added). See also supra note 82.
89. Perry i, 610 So. 2d at 760-61.
90. The prosecution spent most of its brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court addressing the
Harper issue, as that was the specific subject of remand to the trial court by the United States
Supreme Court. As a matter of fact. as addressed by the State of Louisiana in its petition for
rehearing, neither the state nor Perry argued Article I. section 5, in any significant manner, because
both believed the ease would ultimately be resolved on federal law grounds. See Respondent's
Application for Rehearing, State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1993) (No. 91-KP-1324).
91. Perry II1 610 So. 2d at 761. It is important to note that only on remand did the trial court
find, under Harper, that Perry was a danger to himself and others and that the medication was in
Perry's best interest, stating:
I think the record can be read, that is the record in this case ... can reasonably be read
to conclude that Michael Owen Perry is a danger to others; and also, if we assume that
the purpose of mental health treatment is to place a person in good mental health, then
I think we can assume that this medication is in his best medical interest.
See Oral Reasons for Judgment, supra note 22, at 8. This somewhat conclusory statement may lend
credence to Justice Dennis' reference to "manufactured" purposes.
92. Perr' II, 610 So. 2d at 761.
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Turning next to Article 1, section 20, the majority opinion again found the
Louisiana constitutional protections to be broader than those of the federal
constitution. Then, referring to federal jurisprudence, the court laid out four
principles for assessing the constitutional validity of a punishment under section
20: "the punishment must not be 1) degrading to the dignity of human beings;
2) arbitrarily inflicted; 3) unacceptable to contemporary society; or 4) excessive,
i.e., disproportionate to the crime or failing to serve a penal purpose more
effectively than a less severe punishment.
93
With respect to the first criteria, the majority concluded that to execute a
medicated prisoner in a case like Perry is to treat that prisoner as "non-human"
and to remove that person's "common human dignity."" Next, concentrating
on the words "unusual" and "excessive" in Section 20, the court held the ordered
execution scheme violated both the second and fourth criteria above.95 Finally,
the court concluded: "The punishment intended for Perry is severely degrading
to human dignity."'
Moving next to an examination of the potential deterrent effect of the
proposed medication/execution scheme, the court first noted that attempts to
evaluate the deterrent effect of the death penalty in general have been inconclu-
sive. Relying on Gregg v. Georgia, the court reasoned that "it is highly
unlikely that the deterrent value of the death penalty will be increased measur-
ably by including within the class of convicted offenders who may be executed
a category that has been exempt from execution for centuries, viz., the
insane." 98 With respect to retribution, the court found the planned punishment
violated what it called the "principles limiting the unqualified pursuit of
retribution," these being "respect for human dignity and equivalence between
crime and punishment."
Summing up the Section 20 portion of the opinion, the majority wrote:
"Rather than calling upon Perry to suffer only the extinguishment of his life in
a humane manner, the state would have him undergo a course of maltreatment
that is inherently loathsome and degrading to his dignity as a human being."' "W
As a final point, the court concluded the medication/execution scheme ordered
by the court had not been shown by "unequivocal objective evidence" to be
"acceptable to society."'' The last sentence of the majority opinion reads: "In
order to modify this stay order the state must demonstrate to this court that Perry
93. hI. at 762.
94. Id. at 762-63.
95. I. at 765-66.
96. Id. at 766. Note that it is understood here also that the medication is part of the
punishment. See supra note 82.
97. 428 U.S. 153. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
98. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 766 (La. 1992).
99. Id. at 767.
100. Id. at 768.
101. Id. at 770.
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has achieved or regained his sanity and competence for execution independently
of the effects or influence of antipsychotic drugs."'
0 2
Justice Watson joined the opinion, but concurred separately, stating, "the
basic question-whether civilized society can medicate an insane person to make
him temporarily sane in order to kill him-almost answers itself. There is no
overwhelming need to execute this crazy man. Such barbarous action requires




Justice Hall concurred in the Dennis opinion but did not "fully subscribe to
all that is said in Section V," the section dealing with privacy or personhood.'"
Justice Lemmon concurred in the cruel, excessive, or unusual argument of the
court's opinion only.'
0 5
Justice Marcus, in a separate dissent,'o provided a detailed analysis of the
exemption of insane convicts from execution and suggested Louisiana adopt a
definition for competence to be executed which is similar to that of Justice
Powell's definition in Ford v. Wainwright. Then applying, a "reasonable
relationship" test, Justice Marcus weighed Perry's right to refuse medication
against the interest of the state in enforcement of its criminal laws and found
Perry could be forcibly medicated without offending the Louisiana Constitu-
tion. 07
Finally, Justice Cole dissented, ascribing to the view that the forced
medication must be separated from the execution and, as it was in Perry's best
interest, was not cruel or unusual. Citing the need for retribution and the interest
of the state in enforcing its penalty, Justice Cole found Perry's privacy rights
were outweighed and would have held the medication order constitutional.,0
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. General Criticism and the "Final Sentence" Problem
The opinion in Perry i is based on a series of misconceptions. First, the
court fails to make the critical distinction between insanity or medically defined
disorders and legal competence to be executed. By not conducting a complete
legal analysis, the court arrives at the conclusion that the prohibition against
executing insane persons is absolute where a medically defined mental disorder
is found. The court also fails in that it does not finally articulate a clear standard
of competence for execution in Louisiana.
102. Id. at 771.
103. Id. at 771 (Watson, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 771 (Hail, J.. concurring).
105. Id. at 772 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 772 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 775-76 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 778-82 (Cole, J., dissenting).
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Second, the court makes the related mistake of assuming that the medication
involved is not capable of restoring or maintaining Perry's mental competence
at the required level. The last sentence of the opinion, which prohibits the state
from seeking a modification of the stay of execution unless Perry becomes sane
without the influence of drugs, demonstrates that the court accepts the artificial
sanity rationale which was previously rejected in Hampton.'09 This fact may
have significant effects on cases like Hampton and Plaisance, in which
individuals are medicated in order to achieve mental competence to stand trial.
If the last sentence of Perry 11 is read to overturn Hampton and find that mental
incapacity cannot be alleviated by antipsychotic medication, numerous criminals
currently serving sentences may have valid claims for a mistrial. Furthermore,
future court orders to treat charged persons in order to induce capacity to stand
trial (under Article 648) may be subject to constitutional challenge.
The effects of the last sentence may also be significant on the imposition of
the death penalty throughout the state. It has been estimated that up to 70% of
death row inmates have been diagnosed with schizophrenia or psychosis."
If the assumption is made that these diseases are incurable, the viability of the
death penalty as a valid tool of the criminal justice system is threatened.
Furthermore, the notion that a prisoner must be free of drugs to be competent for
execution may encourage numerous death row inmates to seek prescriptions for
antipsychotic medication.
The final ramification of the last sentence is that Michael Owen Perry now
lives on death row and voluntarily receives antipsychotic medication on a regular
basis."' According to the finding of the trial court, PetTy is, when medicated,
competent to stand trial. However, as long as he stays on medication the state
may not seek to modify his stay of execution. This produces the ironic situation
that the very medication the state may not forcibly administer to Perry for his
execution is the barrier to the state's ability to carry out that punishment.
B. The Section 20 Argument-Punishment or Medical Treatment
The primary criticism of the court's cruel and unusual punishment argument
is that it fails to separate the order to medicate from the punishment of
execution. Notwithstanding the "medical treatment" contradiction," 12 the court
assumes the punishment to be: medicate and execute. In fact, most classifica-
tions of this case in law review articles and journals refer to it as a "medicate to
execute" scheme. The actual order by the trial court separated the two events
ordering the execution to take place and finding Perry was competent to be
executed only when medicated. The trial court further ordered that the
109. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
110. Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty 108-09 (1987) (citing
R. Johnson, Condemned to Die: Life Under Sentence of Death (1981)).
111. See suipra note 28 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 82.
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medication, if prescribed, could be given over the defendant's objections if
necessary. While this distinction, at first glance, may seem semantic in nature
only, it significantly weakens the cruel and unusual argument of the supreme
court.
What should be considered in determining if an act is cruel or unusual is the
act itself, not the underlying reason for the commission of the act. The act of
forcible medication itself must be considered to determine if it is cruel or
unusual. Since Louisiana allows forcible medication in some circumstances
where it is in the patient's best medical interest, the act of medication, in and of
itself, should be found neither cruel nor unusual.
Next, the separate issue of executing a medicated inmate must be considered
under the cruel and unusual punishment analysis. If it is not cruel and unusual
to put a competent person to death, how is it cruel and unusual to put to death
a person who is competent only because he was previously involuntarily
medicated?
This distinction is also significant to the medical ethics argument presented
by the majority opinion. The court maintained that a doctor, forced to give
medication to an unwilling patient for the purpose of preparing him to be put to
death, may fail to properly administer the medication or completely treat any side
effects that may arise. The trial court's order, however, left to the doctors the
discretion to prescribe the drugs if found to be in Perry's medical interest. If
Perry refused the drugs, the prison institution could force him to take them." 
3
A final criticism of the Section 20 reasoning is that its general tone and
tenor suggest that it is a diatribe against the death penalty in general. The court
seems to be expressing its repulsion and disdain for what it considers an immoral
or inhumane punishment, After discussing the potential side effects " 4 of the
medication, the court states: "Rather than calling upon Perry to suffer only the
extinguishment of his life in a humane manner, the state would have him
undergo a course of maltreatnent that is inherently loathsome and degrading to
his dignity as a human being." '
Since the state of Louisiana, through its legislature, has found the death
penalty to be a morally acceptable and valid form of punishment and the
113. The medical ethics problem is beyond the scope of this article, but is discussed in depth in
Charles P. Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity'" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 Behav. Sci. and the Law 177 (1987); David L. Katz, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical
Ethics on Death Row-Is Judicial Intervention Warranted, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 707 (1991);
Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnhart, Treating Those Found hicompetent for Evectution:
Ethical Chaos with Only One Solution, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry Law 297 (1988); Rochelle
Graff Salgtiero, Medical Ethics and Competenc To Be Executed, 96 Yale L.J. 167 (1986).
114. There is no evidence that Perry suffered any of the mentioned side effects with the
exception of sleeping for up to 20 hours per day on some occasions. The court's extensive analysis
of the side effects also brings tip the interesting question of how a similar case might be solved in
the future when a drug with the same positive effect as the current drugs but no demonstrable side
effects is developed.
115. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d. 746, 768 (La. 1992) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court of the United States has confirmed the constitutionality of capital
punishment, the Supreme Court of Louisiana should not, at its whim, take the
opportunity to "fray the hangman's knot," to chip away at the death penalty, just
because some members of that court find that particular punishment immoral or
unacceptable. The Perry II opinion may be an example of this phenomenon and
may have more profound effects on capital punishment in Louisiana than even
the court itself intended.
C. The Section 5 Argument-Privacy Run Rampant
It first must be noted that Part V of the opinion, the court's privacy
argument, did not carry a majority of the court. Justice Watson concurred,
Justice Hall did not "fully subscribe to all that is said in Section V of the
opinion,"' 16 and Justice Lemmon concurred with the Dennis opinion only as
to the Section 20 argument. Justice Hall was not specific as to which parts he
accepted or rejected.
Second, there can be little doubt that the protections of Article I, section 5
are greater than those of federal privacy jurisprudence and that, at least since
Hondroulis, the guarantee of privacy has been extended to include personal
autonomy in making medical decisions. Perry II, however, represents a new
extension of the privacy right of Article I, section 5: it is the first case in
Louisiana (and, as far as this author's research demonstrates, in any United
States jurisdiction) in which the punishment of a criminal, in and of itself, was
considered an unconstitutional violation of the convicted person's privacy. Never
before has a government's invasion of personal privacy, after that person has
been found guilty and sentenced, been relied upon to successfully halt the
imposition of that punishment. Extending the privacy right under Section 5 this
far could have serious ramifications on the state's ability to exact any punishment
upon criminal offenders. Is not placing a person in jail or fining a criminal
offender also an invasion of that person's protected privacy rights? Might
Article I, section 5 be used to argue against imposition of these penalties as
well?
Furthermore, no one could argue that, under federal, state, and common law,
a person (even a convicted criminal) has a right to reject medical treatment.
That guarantee, however, is not absolute and can be overcome by a state interest
which justifies intrusion into the person's constitutionally-protected individual
rights." 7 The court in Pert
, 
II correctly applies the compelling state interest
test in balancing the state's needs against the privacy rights afforded Perry under
Section 5. The court's analysis of the state's interests, on the other hand, is
116. Id. at 771 (Hall. J., concurring).
117. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Lav § 645: 'The constitutionally protected right of privacy
extends to an individual's liberty to make decisions regarding psychiatric care without unjustified
governmental interference." (emphasis added)
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somewhat lacking. The court, after summarily dismissing the trial court's finding
that Perry represented a danger to himself and others,2 8 concludes that the
state has available less drastic means of punishment" 9 and that execution of
Perry "will not contribute to the goal of either retribution or deterrence of capital
punishment."' 20 This analysis fails to explore the state's most basic police
power interest-its capability to exact punishment on criminal offenders. Even
held up against a compelling state interest test, this need must tip the scales of
the balancing test toward the state. The state's interest in seeing that its legally
imposed punishments, as recommended by juries and imposed by courts, are
carried out is extremely high. To find that an individual's privacy rights
outweigh this vital public interest sets dangerous precedent and threatens the
integrity of the entire criminal justice system in this state.
Other points must be considered in weighing the interests of the state against
the privacy interest of Perry: on the state's side of the scale must go the fact
that, even if Perry is not a danger to himself and others,'2 ' the state has a
parenspatriae interest since the medication was prescribed by doctors in Perry's
medical best interest. 2 2  Further, Perry's privacy rights must be considered
within the context of his confinement, as stated in Harper and confirmed as
Louisiana law in the case of State v. Patrick.
2 3
In the above light, what the balancing process comes down to is the
somewhat reduced privacy right of the inmate to refuse medication versus the
state's interests in carrying out a legally prescribed penalty, maintaining the
integrity of its criminal justice system, and fulfilling its police power and parens
118. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
119. It has been suggested by some law review commentators that the Louisiana Supreme Court
should have commuted Perry's sentence to life imprisonment. Unlike other states, however, the court
lacks the inherent power to commute death sentences to life. See Nancy S. Horton, Restoration of
Competency for Erecution: Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur, 44 Sw. L.J. 1191 (1990).
120. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 761 (La. 1992).
121. Although the trial court found that he was dangerous, the majority opinion called that
finding "manulfactured" after the fact. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
122, Some may argue that the state's paretns patriae interest in protecting Perry should extend
to the execution itself. That is, the state, knowing that medicating Perry will eventually lead to his
execution, has an interest in avoiding that medication in order to protect Perry from impending death.
This argument, however, is somewhat absurd, when it is considered that the state has already decided
that this inmate must face the death penalty. The state's parens patriae interest in protecting Perry
extends only to ensuring that, up until the time of his death, his suffering from his mental disorder
is minimized.
123. 381 So. 2d 501 (La. 1980). In Patrick. the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
While we have recognized that prisoners are not totally bereft of Fourth Amendment
rights by virtue of their incarceration, we have also declared these rights are diminished
in nature and scope because of confinement for criminal conduct. We have expressly
recognized and declared that an inmate's expectations of privacy are considerably less




patriae duties. Surely the combination of these state interests must be considered
compelling.
Furthermore, the privacy right being weighed against these state interests is
not Perry's right to life, but his right to refuse medication. The state of
Louisiana, through the legislature, the jury, and the trial judge, has already
determined that the state's need to impose the death penalty outweighs Perry's
right to life. If the interests of the state are sufficient to outweigh Perry's most
basic privacy right-the right to life-how can they not be sufficient to outweigh
the considerably lesser privacy right to refuse medication?
Finally, the biggest effect of the Pery 1I privacy argument may be on
Louisiana's capability to forcibly medicate inmates in other than death penalty
situations. If the right to refuse medication is held to a compelling state interest
test and the state's police power and patens patriae rights, as mentioned above,
do not satisfy that test, the constitutionality of Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:830.1 and Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 648 is questionable.
Trial courts rely on the Plaisance and Hampton 2 4 interpretation of Article 648
that defendants may be forcibly medicated to be mentally capable of standing
trial. If that medication is held unconstitutional, numerous current and future
defendants have significant due process claims for mistrial.
V. PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Before a court can answer the question of whether a state may forcibly
medicate a prisoner to achieve competence for execution, it must analyze the
underlying rationales for the death penalty and the exemption of some persons
from that penalty. This section attempts to provide a framework on which that
analysis may be based.
The first point of examination is the rationale for imposing the penalty of
death upon certain convicted criminals. The two most common rationales for
capital punishment are deterrence and retribution. The deterrence argument
envisions the effect on future capital offenders of the possibility that they may
suffer the ultimate penalty and the example set to such potential offenders by the
execution of those convicted. The retribution notion has two sides: first, that
the offender himself be subjected to a punishment equal to, or on a level with,
the crime which he committed; and, second, that society as a whole be provided
with a means of expressing ius moral outrage at certain particularly violent or
heinous criminal acts.
While the success of capital punishment in meeting these two criteria or
satisfying these two goals is somewhat in doubt and the subject of endless legal
debate, that particular question is beyond the scope of this article. What is




important to understand is that deterrence and retribution are the theories upon
which imposition of capital punishment is based.
Having decided why a sovereign state may choose to employ the penalty of
death, it is clear that any proposed execution which does not accomplish either
(or both) of the dual criteria of deterrence and retribution must not take
place. 2 5 Thus, the exemption of an insane or incompetent person from capital
punishment is required whenever it can be shown that, because of that person's
incompetence, his execution will not satisfy society's capital punishment goals.
From this reasoning must come a specific test for competence. To be
effective in cases like Perty, this test should provide a legal standard for
answering the question: when does a mental defect of the condemned person rob
the execution of its capability to deter or of its retributive effect?
To properly address that question, the judiciary must be aware of the
distinction between the legal definition of "incompetence," the medical
assessment of certain mental disorders, and the somewhat loosely defined
concept of insanity. While a judgment that a convicted criminal is incompetent
for execution will unquestionably be based on evidence as to specific mental
disorders, courts should not confuse that medically-defined disorder with legal
incompetence. Courts should avoid use of the broad term "insane" and rely
instead on the more specific legal standard for lack of mental competence to be
executed. This standard should focus on the lack of deterrent and/or retributive
effects, as discussed above. Furthermore, although any such test outlined by
statute or jurisprudence must be clearly and concisely stated, it must be couched
in general requirements since evaluation of mental competence to be executed
must always be done on a case-by-case basis.
Once a clear standard of competence is derived, the next logical question is:
can the medication involved achieve or maintain in a particular individual the
level of mental competence for execution?' 6  This question, like the one
above, is a legal question which will depend to a large extent upon medical
evidence and can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. The distinction
between insanity or medically-defined mental disorders and legal incompetence
is also important at this level of the analysis since, while medical evidence may
demonstrate that insanity or schizoaffective disorders are incurable, the legal
question of whether or not medication brings about a required level of mental
competence is a separate and distinct issue.
125. It may be argued that the death penalty may be justified by only one of the mentioned
criteria, i.e., that even without deterrent effect, capital punishment is necessary based on retribution
alone, or vice versa. In this case, the convicted person's mental capacity would need to alleviate both
rationales for that person to be exempt from the punishment. From the other point of view, where
both rationales are required to justify execution, the absence of either (brought about by incompe-
tence) is enough to exempt an incompetent person. Whether one or both criteria for capital
punishment is required is a matter for debate and beyond the scope of this article.
126. For an excellent article addressing the effects that antipsychotic dngs have on mental
disorders and intellectual functions in general, see Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 2.
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Only after conducting the above analysis, developing a clear standard foi
competence for execution, and determining that a condemned inmate can be
maintained at the appropriate level only by the administration of antipsychotic
medication, may the court address the central question of Perry ll--can the state
force that medication upon that person? This question commands an examination
of both the prisoner's right to refuse the medication (assuming he is mentally
competent to make such a judgment) and the state's interest in carrying out its
legally imposed penalty.
There can be little doubt that a person has a right to make personal decisions
about whether to accept or reject an invasion into his body. Whether rooted in
Fourteenth Amendment due process or liberty analysis, Louisiana constitutional
or statutory guarantees, or judicially-created common-law doctrines such as
informed consent, it is axiomatic that such a right is guaranteed to all persons.
The right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute, however. It must be
balanced against the state's interest in administering that medication.' 27 In a
case like Perry, those interests include the state's interest in can'ying out sentenc-
es prescribed by the judicial system and the related interest in maintaining the
integrity of and confidence in the system of criminal justice. Applying an
analysis similar to that used in Harper, the state may also have a parens patriae
interest (if the medication is found to be in the prisoner's own best interests or
he is found to be a danger to himself) and a police power interest (if the
unmedicated prisoner is found to represent a danger to other inmates or prison
personnel).
In weighing the condemned prisoner's interests against those of the state, the
court should employ a compelling state interest test, since the guarantee against
unwarranted bodily invasion should be classified as a fundamental right.
Furthermore, Louisiana courts should also consider the Louisiana Supreme
Court's judicial interpretation of Article 1, section 5, in which the court has
determined that Louisiana's express protection of privacy is broader than that of
the United States Constitution.
If the state employs this balancing approach and finds the state's interests
outweigh those of the incompetent, condemned inmate, there is still another
necessary step in the constitutional analysis. The Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment must be considered in the context of the
medication and/or execution order. Again, the Louisiana jurisprudence has
interpreted Article 1, section 20's rule against cruel, excessive, or unusual
punishment to be broader in scope and provide more protection than that of the
Eighth Amendment.
Under either rule, the first question in the analysis must be: should the
ordered medication be considered separate from the imposition of the penalty of
127. See Riggins v. Nevada. 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
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death or a part of the execution itself? If it is considered part of the penalty,
then, arguably, a medication/execution scheme is both excessive and arbitrary
(i.e. unusual). Furthermore, since most death penalty statutes (including
Louisiana's) do not authorize antipsychotic medication as part of the punishment
for the specific capital crimes involved, a court may lack the inherent authority
to sentence a convicted offender to a punishment of medication and execution.
If, on the other hand, the medication order is seen as a separate order, distinct
from the sentence of death, the order could scarcely be described as cruel,
excessive, or unusual punishment, assuming, of course, the medication is
prescribed by a doctor and in the patient's medical best interest.
Under the cruel and unusual analysis, one must also consider whether or not
a particular punishment is degrading to a prisoner's humanity or does not
comport with society's notions of moral and acceptable punishment. These
factors necessitate an analysis of the actual and potential side effects of the
medication on the particular person involved. Again the distinction between a
separate medication order and medication as part of the execution must be made,
since forcible medication, in and of itself, is authorized by Louisiana and has
been held constitutional.' 28
Only if the medication order passes each of the tests above can the state
constitutionally carry out the forcible medication of the condemned, incompetent
person. If, however, the court finds that the medication order fails either of the
above tests, and that the state may not forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to
an incompetent inmate for the purposes of readying him for execution, one final
question must be answered: under what circumstances may the state proceed
with the execution? Obviously, if the condition which causes the mental
incompetence of the inmate changes naturally such that he is subsequently found
to meet the required standard, the execution may be carried out. The more
difficult question, however, is whether the state may proceed with the impositidn
of the death penalty if the inmate is restored to competence after voluntarily
taking the drugs or being forced to accept the medication under some other
circumstances, perhaps like those in the Harper case. This question is easily
answered if one bears in mind the distinction between insanity and incompetence.
If the standard for execution is based solely on the legal definition of compe-
tence, the execution may be carried out as long as the condemned person meets
that standard, no matter how that level of mental competence may have come
about.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Perry H1 opinion leaves many questions unanswered. What is the exact
standard of competence to be executed in Louisiana? May the state forcibly
administer antipsychotic drugs to criminal defendants under any circumstances?
128. See Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990); La. R.S. 15:831.1 (1992).
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The opinion also sets some dangerous precedents which could have serious
effects on Louisiana criminal law: it assumes that insanity cannot be cured by
antipsychotic medication, allowing convicted capital offenders like Perry to use
that medication as a shield from the death penalty. It expands the privacy right
of Article I, section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution into the realm of criminal
punishment, which may, at some point, have serious effects on the imposition of
non-capital punishments in this state. It holds the state to an extremely high
standard to overcome a prisoner's right to refuse medication, thereby threatening
the state's capability to forcibly medicate a prisoner under any circumstances.
Perry 11 requires action by both the legislature and Louisiana Supreme
Court. Taking its example from the many states that have already done so,
129
Louisiana should statutorily adopt the Powell understanding test for competence
to be executed."3 ° Procedures for determining mental capacity to be executed
should be outlined and may bear resemblance to those of Articles 641-649.1.
The bill should specifically state that the test is legal in nature, although it
necessarily depends upon medical evidence, and that a medical determination of
schizophrenia, insanity, or any other specific mental disorder is not dispositive
of the competence question. Furthermore, the legislature should include in the
bill a statement of how the test for competence relates to its underlying rationale
for imposition of the death penalty in certain cases. Finally, the legislature
should clearly state its interest in seeing that the death penalty is carried out once
a defendant is legally sentenced, stressing its police power interest in maintaining
order. The bill may even go so far as to specifically state that competence which
is produced or maintained only through the administration of medication (be it
voluntarily taken or forcibly administered for some purpose other than to produce
competence for execution) is valid competence for execution.'
129. For a survey of the competence standards of the various states, see the appendix to Ward,
supra note 32. at 99-107.
130. The understanding requirement may incorporate by reference some of the Bennett criteria
mentioned above. See stpra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
131. Proposed statute:
C.Cr.P. XX:
XX. Mental Competence to be Executed
Competence to be executed. (a) A person who has been sentenced to death by the State
of Louisiana may not be executed if he does not understand the nature and purpose of that
sentence and its relationship to the crime committed or is not aware of the impending
nature of the punishment.
(b) The question of competence to be executed is separate from the question of capacity
to proceed tinder C. Cr. P. 641 et. seq. and may be raised by motion of the defendant to
the sentencing court after sentencing has taken place.
(c) The defendant has the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of
the evidence. Medical evidence as to a specific mental defect or disorder may be
considered. but shall not be dispositive of the question of competence to be executed.
(d) The fact that the mental competence demonstrated by the defendant is maintained
by the use of psychotropic or other medication will not. in and of itself, render that
defendant incompetent for execution.
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Once the above is accomplished, the knowledge and understanding required
for a sound analysis of the Perry issue will be available to courts. Only then can
the Louisiana Supreme Court properly weigh the interests of the state against the
interests of a defendant and obtain a correct judgment. The court should also
examine the last sentence of the Per) I/ opinion. If it finds that sentence
constitutionalizes the notion of artificial sanity or the idea that competence for
execution cannot be obtained through antipsychotic medication, it should
expressly overrule that language.
David P. S. Charitat
